Abstract-In this paper we investigate the behavior of degreebased clustering algorithms with respect to their stability and attack-resistance. Our attack scenario tries to bias the clustering head selection procedure by sending faulty degree claims. We propose a randomized variant of the highest degree algorithm which is proved, through experimental results, attack-resistant without imposing significant overhead to the clustering performance. In addition, we extend our proposal with a cooperative consistent clustering algorithm which integrates security into the clustering decision achieving attacker identification and classification.
I. INTRODUCTION
S ELF-organization in hierarchical structures with multilevel clustering is appealing in large scale Mobile Ad Hoc Networks and Wireless Sensor Networks. However, two clustering issues remain challenging in dynamic mobile environments: a) how to minimize the re-clustering overhead in the face of network partitions (link or node outages), and b) how to make the clustering procedure attack-resistant without sacrificing clustering and network performance.
Regarding a), many heuristic solutions can be found in the literature [1] which they select new cluster heads (CH) when sub-network merging or split is detected. Regarding b), in [2] a cluster-based cooperative IDS is proposed in which only the fairly and securely selected CHs perform traffic monitoring and intrusion detection. We address a) by proposing a cooperative weighted clustering scheme, the Consistent Clustering Algorithm (CCA), and we address b) in two different ways, namely by proposing a randomized version (RHD) of the highest degree algorithm (HD) and by integrating into CCA a cooperative mechanism in which any node can act as a detector that correlates the advertized node claims in order to identify the attackers. We concentrate on the protection of the weighted clustering schemes because their merits are numerous, namely they are application-independent, using weight-optimization they can be adaptable to different network conditions (e.g., topology changes due to mobility), they are applicable to both centralized and distributed architectures and they allow for simultaneous self-organization and self-protection when extended with security components. One disadvantage is that they may introduce significant communications overhead and Manuscript received December 30, 2011. The associate editor coordinating the review of this letter and approving it for publication was G. Lazarou.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/LCOMM.2012.031912.112484 processing delays (unless the clustering information is exchanged only locally). Our experimental results show that when the CH selection procedure is protected, an additional re-clustering overhead is imposed. Particularly, the proposed CCA selected as CH one of the simulated attackers with the least probability but, on average, the CCA CH change rate was found approximately three times more than that of HD. On the other hand, the proposed randomized CH selection (RHD) can offer protection in the sparse network case with small processing and re-clustering overhead. Section II presents our conceptual model and the compared clustering algorithms. Next, in section III we present our assumptions, the integrated simulation model and the experimental results. Section IV draws the conclusions.
II. CONCEPTUAL MODEL Our conceptual model is based on the ad hoc selforganization concept, as shown in Fig. 1 . This model demands global agreement (consensus) to be reached for cluster formation and for intruder identification. Moreover, the ad hoc routes are selected after a mutual exchange of opinions amongst the neighboring nodes. Fig. 1 shows two complementary defense blocks, namely the cryptographic (encryption, authentication with digital signatures and key management) and the cooperative (includes intrusion detection with consensus, reputation/trust, voting and game-based schemes). We concentrate here on the cooperative secure clustering schemes since we want to evaluate the efficiency of such mechanisms (especially consistency thresholds) as substitutes for cryptographic primitives. In that respect, 1089-7798/12$31.00 c 2012 IEEE we propose a randomized variant of the highest degree and we extend our proposal with the cooperative CCA. Also, we investigate how HD and its variant WHD behave under attack. The CH selection criteria for each algorithm follow.
A. Highest Degree (HD)
HD is a well-known ad hoc clustering algorithm in which as local CH is selected the node with the maximum connectivity degree, i.e., the node with the maximum number of uncovered in-range neighbors (periodic broadcast messages are used for one-hop neighbor detection).
B. Weighted Highest Degree (WHD)
WHD [4] is a variant of the HD algorithm in which the clustering score V i for each node i is calculated as the inverse of the sum of the degrees of his j neighbors, Eq. (1).
WHD gives high priority to low-degree nodes with many neighbors aiming to reduce the number of clusters.
C. Randomized Highest Degree (RHD)
RHD is part of our proposal in which the top−k neighbors, i.e., the nodes having the k largest advertised degrees are found and the new local CH is drawn randomly (by the old CH) amongst the top − k neighbors. We used the uniform random number generator; however we recommend the use of parameterized pseudo-random generators for increased guarantees of security.
D. Consistent Clustering Algorithm (CCA)
The proposed CCA for each node i takes into account its degree deg i (the number of nodes whose Euclidean distance from i is less than the radio range of i), an energy-related fairness factor F i (how many times i has previously served as CH), a security-related component and the node's Euclidean distance L i from the cluster's maximum range (nodes located at the neighborhood center are more preferable). Eq. (2) presents the normalized clustering variable V i of CCA:
where the coefficients a, b, c t and d satisfy the following:
The third component in Eq. (2) protects the CH selection from nodes that advertise faulty degrees in order to gain the CH role and hence control the network. CCA classifies each node as normal, suspect or attacker and allocates a different value of c t for each type of node according to Eq. (4).
CCA detects those nodes that send unreasonably high claims by evaluating the ratio of the number N f of the Table; neighbors found to contain i in their Neighbor Lists over the degree deg i advertized by i (log 2 n binary search processing delay). When the ratio of the search result (N f ) over deg i is less than or equal to the second threshold (set to 2/3 according to the byzantine agreement requirement [4] ) node i is classified as suspect (yellow alarm). According to CCA, a suspect is not immediately excluded but he is penalized by reducing his score V i . Further, the maximum acceptable advertised degree deg i is equal to the network size, which is assumed known. If this threshold is exceeded, the monitored node i is marked as attacker and it is immediately excluded from both the clustering and the routing procedures (red alarm raised). Table  I presents the pseudo-code of the proposed CCA. CCA consists of three phases, namely the set-up (Phase I), the CH selection (Phase II) and the re-clustering phase (Phase III). In Phase I the network state is initialized while during Phase II the nodes select the CHs. If the previous state of a new selected CH was simple member, re-clustering is performed (Phase III) i.e., the CH changes are increased, and the node states and the clustering tables are updated. In addition, the neighbors have to associate with the new announced CH by sending him a join message and the new CH has to acknowledge each one of them. This three-phase clustering structure is also followed by the rest compared algorithms, namely RHD, HD and WHD however in the respective implementations each algorithm makes decisions according to its own CH selection criteria (as described previously).
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We simulated nodes that move randomly according to the Random Waypoint model broadcasting their degrees (true or not), their Neighbor Lists (true or not) and their coordinates (only true, known via GPS or other localization means). Any node can be a CH (peers in both software and hardware). The clustering procedure yields two-hop clusters and two types of nodes: a) simple nodes (e.g., tiny sensors) which perform nothing more than default routing to their CH, and b) CHs which aggregate, filter, secure and route the received messages from the simple nodes to the final destination via the other CHs. No two selected CHs must be in range. Every node is covered by a CH. There is a maximum on the cluster membership (25 nodes). We assume that the clustering of L legitimate nodes (L=95) is threatened by two types of N in total attackers (N =5): a) by class A attackers who advertise a degree which is larger than the network size, and b) by class B attackers who advertise degrees lower than the network size but inconsistently high. We generated two random models of the node degree deg i in order to evaluate the impact of the initial topology on the clustering performance. We used a) the uniform distribution (U) to simulate sparse scenarios in which the nodes with sufficient energy are weighted more (e.g., home ad hoc applications), and b) the heavy tail (HT) Pareto distribution (P) to simulate groupe-dense scenarios, e.g., military ad hoc applications in which the nodes with higher connectivity are more important. For the Pareto model we set the coefficients (a, b, c t , d) of Eq. (2) equal to (0. 4, 0.2, 0.4, 0) so that the connectivity and security are weighted more during the CH selection phase. Fig. 2 shows the CH change rates with respect to the ad hoc radio range. Low radio range values correspond to a low powered sparse network while high radio ranges to a dense one. Eeach point in Fig. 2 is the average of 50 measurements. Fig. 2 demonstrates that each algorithm is more stable in the Pareto than the Uniform placement case. HD/P achieved the most stable clustering followed by RHD/P. By averaging the rate values over the radio ranges, HD/P is found by 11.91% more stable than RHD/P. The CCA/P CH change curve lies between RHD/P and WHD/P and by averaging over the radio ranges, the CCA/P is found by 219.6% less stable than HD/P. Fig. 2 shows fluctuations in the CH change rate curves due to our setting of clustering with restricted membership. Under the same conditions, each point in Fig. 3 shows the probability (average of 50 measurements) to select an attacker as CH including the standard deviation which increases with the radio range. As shown in Fig. 3 , CCA/P is the most attack resistant algorithm, especially when the network is highly connected. By averaging over the radio range values, CCA/P is found by 58.04% more attack resistant than HD/P. Fig. 4 shows the number of the created clusters (average of 50 measurements) Fig. 3 . The probability to select an attacker as CH per ad hoc radio range. per ad hoc radio range. HD/P achieved the least number of created clusters followed by CCA/P, RHD/P and WHD/P.
IV. DISCUSSION
All four degree-based algorithms were found more stable for the node placement with HT characteristics. RHD achieved encouraging performance results. CCA achieved to identify the faulty claims and hence avoided the impact of compromising the CHs (such as packet loss). However, CCA imposed a significant re-clustering overhead. We conclude that the applicability of a specific cooperative mechanism depends on the ad hoc application, the network conditions, the resources and the type and level of threats.
